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We recently showed that rapidly stopping an action in the face of a reward-related
stimulus reduces the subjective value of that stimulus (Wessel et al., 2014). In that study,
there were three phases. In an initial learning phase, geometric shapes were associated
with monetary value via implicit learning. In a subsequent treatment phase, half the
shapes were paired with action stopping, and half were not. In a final auction phase,
shapes that had been paired with stopping in the treatment phase were subjectively
perceived as less valuable compared to those that were not. Exploratory post hoc
analyses showed that the stopping-induced devaluation effect was larger for participants
with greater explicit knowledge of stimulus values. Here, we repeated the study in 65
participants to systematically test whether the level of explicit knowledge influences the
degree of devaluation. The results replicated the core result that action stopping reduces
stimulus value. Furthermore, they showed that this effect was indeed significantly larger
in participants with more explicit knowledge of the relative stimulus values in the learning
phase. These results speak to the robustness of the stopping-induced devaluation effect,
and furthermore imply that behavioral therapies using stopping could be successful in
devaluing real-world stimuli, insofar as stimulus values are explicitly represented. Finally,
to facilitate future investigations into the applicability of these findings, as well as the
mechanisms underlying stopping-induced stimulus devaluation, we herein provide open
source code for the behavioral paradigm.
Keywords: value, stop-signal task, inhibitory control, implicit learning, devaluation, cognitive control
INTRODUCTION
Overvaluation of reward-associated stimuli is a common feature ofmany unhealthy andmaladaptive
behaviors. For example, obese people show an increased response in value-associated brain regions
when viewing pictures of high-caloric foods (Rothemund et al., 2007), smoking-related cues increase
nicotine consumption and craving in smokers (Hogarth et al., 2010), and monetary cues evoke
disproportionate value-related neural activity in pathological gamblers (Clark et al., 2013; Sescousse
et al., 2013). Hence, changing such valuation patterns could be key in enabling people to overcome
unhealthy behaviors triggered by external stimuli (Wisotsky and Swencionis, 2003; Root et al., 2009;
Rupprecht et al., 2015).
One potential way to reduce the value of a stimulus is through motor inhibition. Several authors
have hypothesized that stopping or withholding a response in the face of a valuable stimulus
might lead to devaluation of that stimulus (Veling et al., 2008, 2013; Houben et al., 2012a). Many
studies have been conducted to test whether stopping/withholding a response can indeed lead
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to behavioral changes that could potentially be reflective of
stimulus devaluation. Such studies used stimuli that ranged from
food (Nederkoorn et al., 2010, 2012; Houben, 2011; Houben and
Jansen, 2011; Houben et al., 2012b; Allom and Mullan, 2015;
Lawrence et al., 2015) to emotional pictures and faces (Fenske
et al., 2005; Raymond et al., 2005; Kiss et al., 2008; Veling
et al., 2008; Doallo et al., 2012; Ferrey et al., 2012; Frischen
et al., 2012) to alcoholic beverages (Houben et al., 2011, 2012a;
Bowley et al., 2013; Jones and Field, 2013). However, as we have
argued previously (Wessel et al., 2014), not all of these studies
operationalized response inhibition in a way that actually requires
the stopping of an initiated response, and not all measured value
in a way that is economically sound (contrast that with Schonberg
et al., 2011, 2014).
In our recent report, we presented an experimental paradigm
that does require rapid action stopping of an initiated response,
and does employ an economically sound measure of subjective
value (Wessel et al., 2014). Using this paradigm, we showed that
rapid action stopping in the face of rewarding stimuli reduces
the subjective value of those stimuli. The behavioral paradigm
had three phases. First, we associated different geometric shapes
(triangles, circles, etc.) with monetary reward. In this initial
learning phase, participants were instructed to respond to the
appearance of a given shape on each trial, with a reward being
delivered after each response. Unbeknownst to the participants,
reward delivery followed a fixed schedule, which associated each
shape with a specific value. In a subsequent treatment phase,
participants then performed a version of the stop-signal task
(Logan et al., 1984) in which they responded to the same shapes
that were presented to them in the learning phase. Half of the
shapes were sometimes paired with stop signals, while the other
half of the shapes was never paired with stopping. Finally, we
probed participants’ subjective valuations of the shapes using
an auction procedure from behavioral economics (Becker et al.,
1964). We found that the shapes that had been previously paired
with action stopping were perceived as less valuable.
Notably, that study was designed to test the devaluation
of largely implicit value associations: participants were not
supposed to know that the shapes were differentially rewarded
in the learning phase, since we conjectured that implicit value
representations could be more susceptible to behavioral change
than explicit representations (Marteau et al., 2012). A post-
experimental questionnaire, which assessed participants’ explicit
awareness of the fixed reward schedule in the learning phase by
probing their verbalizable knowledge (Seger, 1994), showed that
our procedure largely achieved its aim of associating shape-value
at an implicit level: only 15 out of 55 participants reported
noticing a contingency. However, an exploratory data analysis
showed that—contrary to the initial assumption— this subsample
of 15 participants showed even greater stopping-induced
stimulus devaluation (i.e., an increased effect size compared to
the subgroup without any explicit knowledge). However, this
observation was not the result of a systematic investigation, and
furthermore resulted from a numerical comparison of the effect
sizes rather than a direct test.
The question of whether conscious awareness of one’s subjec-
tive valuations affects stopping-induced stimulus devaluation is
important, since it could have implications for which kinds of
real-world stimuli (cigarettes, cake, alcohol) could be devalued,
and how such devaluation could be optimally achieved. Hence,
we here aimed to systematically test whether stopping-induced
stimulus devaluation differentially affects explicit or implicit value
representations. We used the same paradigm as in our previous
study, in a large sample of 65 participants. We aimed to categorize
participants into two separate groups, based on their verbalizable
knowledge of the stimulus values, and to compare these groups
with respect to their stopping-induced stimulus devaluation.
Based on our previous exploratory analysis (Wessel et al., 2014; see
above), we predicted that the group of participants with explicit
knowledge of the reward contingency would show increased




Sixty-seven healthy volunteers were recruited using flyers on
the UCSD campus, and were paid for participation ($10 base-
payment, additional money to be earned in the task). Participants
signed written informed consent prior to participating in the
study, the study was approved by the local institutional review
board, and all experimentation was conducted in accordance
with the Declaration of Helsinki. Two participants were excluded
based on their stop signal task data (see below for exclusion
criteria), leaving a sample ofN = 65 (mean age 21.54 years, range:
18–53 year; 36 female, one left-handed).
Materials
Stimuli were presented on Apple Macintosh computers (Apple
Inc., Cupertino, CA, USA) running MATLAB 2012a (The
MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA) and Psychtoolbox 3 (Brainard,
1997). Responses were made using a QWERTY-keyboard.
Experimental Task
The experiment was identical to Experiment 2 of our previous
study (Wessel et al., 2014), with the exception that the number of
trials varied for part of this sample (see below). Accordingly, below
we mostly recapitulate the very methods section from that paper
(Wessel et al., 2014, p. 2317–2320). We also provide the MATLAB
code for the experiment, along with detailed documentation on
how to run it at https://github.com/janwessel/stopdeval.
The task was divided into three parts (Figures 1A–C).
Learning Phase
In this phase (Figure 1A), we associated eight different geometric
shapes with four different monetary values. Two shapes each were
associatedwithmean values of $0.5, $1, $2, or $4, respectively. The
shapes were a square, a circle, a diamond, a triangle, an inverted
triangle, a cross, a hexagon, and an “I”-shape (Figure 1D). The
different shapeswere also colored (white, green, blue, yellow, cyan,
magenta, orange, or gray; Figure 1E), in order to maximize the
chances of acquiring an implicit value association. Color-shape
pairingswere randomized for each participant, and then remained
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FIGURE 1 | Task diagram. (A) Learning phase. Each shape was repeatedly shown and rewarded according to a pre-defined schedule that associated it with one of
four different reward values. (B) Treatment phase. One of the two shapes per value level was paired with stop-signals 75% of the time, while the other was never
paired with stopping. (C) Auction phase. Participants repeatedly bid monetary value on each of the shapes from the previous two phases. (D,E) Possible shapes and
colors. Colors and shapes were randomly paired for each participant, and the resultant combination was then randomly assigned to one of the four value levels in the
learning phase, as well as either the stopping or non-stopping condition in the treatment phase.
constant throughout the experiment. The shapes were randomly
assigned to a given value for each participant.
A trial proceeded as follows. A fixation cross was presented for
500 ms, which divided the screen into four quadrants. Then, one
of the eight shapes appeared in one of the quadrants. Participants
pressed one button (out of four possible) corresponding to that
quadrant. There was a deadline of 1000 ms; if no response was
made within that period, a “too slow” message appeared for
1000 ms. Immediately after the response, a payment amount was
indicated on the screen: a black square was superimposed on the
stimulus display, within which the message “You won $ X.XX”
appeared (for 1000ms). Participants were told that responding “as
fast and accurately as possible” would lead to higher rewards. To
ensure that participants paid attention to themagnitude of reward
in this phase, we told them that the computer would randomly
pick five of the trials at the end of the experiment and pay out
the amount associated with those trials. After the reward display,
the screen was cleared before the next trial, resulting in a trial
duration of 3000 ms. Trials on which misses (no response before
deadline) or errors (wrong button) occurred were repeated until
the correct response was made. Most importantly, unbeknownst
to the participants, the trial-by-trial monetary reward schedule
was actually independent of performance, and instead followed
a pre-defined schedule: Each stimulus had one of four fixed
distributions of possible payout values randomly assigned to
them. The distributions centered around four different means
(either $0.5, $1, $2, or $4), with a uniform dispersion of 25c
around thosemeans. To ensure that the value representationswere
largely implicit, only 80% of the trials per shape were rewarded
according to this distribution. On the remaining 20% of trials,
the reward was 01. Each shape had an identical probability of
appearing in any of the four quadrants. Thirty-one participants
performed 50 trials per shape (400 overall), which were presented
in four blocks.
After running 31 participants, we paused and assessed the
number of participants with at least partially explicit knowledge
(see below for procedure). As only five of these had any explicit
knowledge, we increased the number of trials in the learning
phase for the remaining sample of participants (N = 34). These
participants performed 72 trials per shape (60 rewarded according
to the schedule, 12 non-rewarded), which were presented in six
blocks. We reasoned that more value training would increase the
number of participants with explicit value representations; better
allowing us to compare groups with and without explicit value
representations.
Treatment Phase
In this phase (Figure 1B), we used the eight shapes from the earlier
learning phase, which were now associated with different values.
The primary task for the participants was to make a quick motor
1The fact that shapes were only rewarded according to the predetermined
schedule on 80% of the trials actually reduces their associated value to
0.8 ($0.5, 1, 2, 4); i.e., the actual values associated with the stimuli are $0.4,
$0.8, $1.6, and $3.2, respectively. For simplicity reasons, we will continue to
refer to the value steps according to the means of their reward distributions,
i.e., $0.5, $1, $2, and $4.
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response according to the placement of the shape on the computer
screen (left or right), and to stop their impending response when
a stop-signal occurred. Four out of these eight shapes (one per
value-step, i.e., one shape each associated with a mean value of
$0.5, $1, $2, or $4) were always paired with Go trials (i.e., a
stop signal was never presented on trials with these shapes). The
other half of the eight shapes (which were also associated with
mean values of $0.5, $1, $2, or $4), were paired with stop signals
on some of the trials (on 75% of trials for each stimulus; i.e.,
27 out of 36 trials). Ideally, these latter shapes would be paired
100% of the time with stop signals (to increase the potential
effect of action stopping on stimulus valuation). However, a
relative probability of stop vs. go-trials of 0.5 would diminish the
prepotency of the go-response. Furthermore, we were concerned
that a fully deterministic pairing of some shapes with stopping
on 100% of trials would potentially lead to the emergence of
explicit knowledge on the participants’ part. Such awareness of
the pairing might cause participants to consciously withhold their
response on these shapes on trials after they picked up on the
contingency, which would turn this task into a decision making
task instead of a stopping-task (because participants might just
decide to never initiate a response once they realize that some
shapes are always paired with stopping). Hence, we decided to
pair the stopping-shapes with stopping on 75% of the trials only
(resulting in an overall probability of a stop-signal of 37.5%), in
order to achieve a good tradeoff betweenmaximizing the potential
effects of stopping on devaluation and avoiding the detrimental
effect of a deterministic contingency.
A trial proceeded as follows. The screen was divided into two
halves by a vertical line for 500 ms. The same shapes from the
learning phase then appeared to the left or right of this line.
Participants were instructed to respond as fast and accurately
as possible according to the position of the shape by using one
of two buttons on the keyboard (deadline: 1000 ms), one with
their left hand, and one with their right hand. Participants were
instructed that occasional stop-signals (200 ms sine-wave tones,
900 Hz) would occur shortly after stimulus-onset—in which case
they should try to cancel the response. The stop-signal delay (SSD)
was adapted separately for left and right responses depending
on ongoing performance (+50 ms following successful stop-
trials,  50 ms following failed stop-trials) to achieve an overall
probability of successful stopping p(stop) of 0.5 (Verbruggen
and Logan, 2009). The SSD’s initial value was set to 250 ms.
Participantswere instructed that successful stopping on stop-trials
and fast responding on go-trials were equally important. The first
31 participants performed 36 trials for each shape (288 overall),
split into eight blocks. The remaining 34 participants, for whom
we changed the trial numbers in the learning phase, performed
44 trials for each shape (352 overall), split into 11 blocks. In the
breaks between blocks, participants received information about
their Go-trial reaction time (GoRT), as well as their miss- and
(direction-) error-rates. Additionally, the experimenter (but not
the participant) received information about p(stop) and SSD to
ensure that participants were not overly favoring stopping over
going or vice versa. In case the participant appeared to favor either
strategy, the experimenter informed the participant to remember
that both stopping and going were equally important. We aimed
to achieve the following behavioral parameters in each block:
GoRT between 400 and 650 ms, p(stop) between 0.4 and 0.6, and
SSD> 100ms. Note that in this treatment phase subjects were not
reimbursed—in effect, the cues were presented in extinction.
Valuation Phase
In this phase (Figure 1C), we repeatedly presented each of the
eight shapes (the same ones as those from the earlier two phases)
to the participants and instructed them to bid money on each
shape according to an auction procedure (Becker et al., 1964)
designed to assess the “true” subjective value of a given good
or object. The participants were presented with six different
cent-amounts that they could choose as their bid using one of
six keys on the keyboard (r, t, y, u, i, o; the button-mappings
were spatially congruent and displayed on the screen under the
respective values). Participants were instructed to choose the cent-
amount that most closely represented their subjective valuation of
the shape. This was implemented using an auction procedure (the
exact instructions can be found along with the MATLAB code).
Participants were instructed to neither overbid nor underbid, as
both of those strategies would be suboptimal. They were told that
optimal bidding behaviorwould lead to larger payoffs, and that the
payoff from the auction phase would be paid out at the end of the
experiment, in addition to the payment from the initial learning
phase.
A trial proceeded as follows. A fixation-cross was displayed for
500 ms, after which one of the shapes from the earlier two phases
was presented centrally for 1,500 ms. Then, the six potential bids
and their button mappings were presented, and participants had
5,000 ms to pick an amount to bid. The overall trial-duration was
fixed at 6,000 ms, with the remainder of the 5,000 ms response-
window going to the inter-trial interval. Each of the eight shapes
was presented 10 times (i.e., there were 80 trials total), each time
with six potentials bids, as explained above. These bids came
from five different sets of values. Specifically: (34, 68, 102, 136,
170, 204), (39, 78, 117, 156, 195, 234), (44, 88, 132, 176, 220,
264), (49, 98, 147, 196, 245, 294), and (54, 108, 162, 216, 270,
324). We chose to use multiple different sets of values in order
to induce variance into the bidding behavior, specifically, so that
participants did not bid the exact same value every time they saw
a given shape. These sets of bids were chosen so that the overall
range of values completely covered the range of true values that
were associated with each shape in the learning phase (40, 80,
160, and 320 cents, respectively). Each set was presented twice
for each shape, in random order. The bids within each set were
randomly assigned to one of the six response buttons on each trial.
The shapes themselveswere also presented in randomorder across
the 80 trials. Trials were presented in four blocks.
PROCEDURE
Participants were first instructed on both the learning-phase and
the treatment-phase. They practiced both phases briefly (10 trials
each), before performing the actual learning- and treatment-
phases. Thereafter, they read the instructions of the auction. The
experimenter made sure that the auction procedure was fully
understood, placing special emphasis on the fact that systematic
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over- or underbidding, or bidding according to any other rationale
than the participant’s subjective value, would lead to suboptimal
earnings at the end of the experiment. After the valuation-phase,
we assessed participants’ conscious awareness of both the learning
phase and stopping phase regularities using the questionnaire
described in the next paragraph. Finally, the computer picked five
trials from the learning phase, which were added and paid out
to the participants, in addition to a $2 bonus for the valuation
phase (while participants were bidding with the expectation that
five random trials would be paid out, we did not actually perform
an artificial auction, and instead paid this constant amount for
simplicity). Participants came away from the experiment with
between $4 and $14 in addition to the base payment of $10.
Probe of Explicit Awareness of Relative
Stimulus Values
We used a questionnaire to verbally probe the amount of explicit
knowledge about the two main regularities of the procedure: (1)
the reward schedule in the learning phase (question 1 below) and
(2) the fact that only some shapes were paired with stop-signals
in the stopping phase (question 2 below). The experimenter asked
the participants the following five questions (numbering is for the
reader and was not provided to participants):
(1a) What strategy did you use in the last part of the experiment?
(auction phase)
(1b) Did you think that any shapes were associated with higher
or lower reward during the first phase of the experiment?
(learning phase)
(1c) If so, which? If so, did you utilize that information in the last
phase? (auction phase)
(2a) Did you notice anything about the second phase of the
experiment? (stopping phase)
(2b) Did you notice that some shapes were paired with stop
signals more often than others? If so, which?
(3) Any other comments or remarks?
Analysis
Types of Knowledge
The questionnaire assayed the level of verbalizable explicit
knowledge of the reward schedule in the learning phase. The
classification was done as follows.
Explicit learner
This designation was given if a participant reported a “feeling
of knowing” of the regularities in response to the open question
about the auction phase (1a), and could accurately name at least
one shape forwhich the regularity was true in response to question
1b. For example, the participant could state “The green square
was always paired with high reward,” or “The white diamond was
always paired with low rewards.”
Implicit learner
These participants reported not noticing any regularities in
response to any of the questions in the debriefing questionnaire.
Valuation Phase
The effects of interest were measured in the auction phase. They
were tested using a 2  2  4 ANOVA with the within-subjects
factors VALUE (four levels: low, medium low, medium high,
high) and STOPPING (two levels: 0 and 75%), the between-
subjects factor KNOWLEDGE (two levels: explicit, implicit), and
the dependent variable BIDDING-LEVEL (1–6, ranging from
the lowest to the highest option within each set of bids). Before
parametric testing, the main variable of interest (the devaluation
score—i.e., the difference score of all stop-trial bids and all go-
trials bids) was tested for outliers using the 1.5 interquartile
range criterion for each group (explicit and implicit) separately.
If any subjects were excluded from the parametric tests based on
this criterion, testing was repeated using a non-parametric test for
which the outliers were included. Effect sizes for the ANOVAwere
expressed in units of partial!2 (denoted!2p), and in units of r [with
r = Z/sqrt(N)] for the non-parametric tests.
Treatment Phase
To ensure the validity of the racemodel and to verify that stopping
behavior was typical, we also analyzed the behavioral data from
the stopping phase. To examine the validity of the race model,
we tested whether GoRT was slower than failed-stop RT for each
participant. We also examined the data in terms of the probability
of stopping (which should be in the range 0.4–0.6) and stop-
signal reaction time (SSRT), which should be in the range of about
120–300 ms, based on typical manual stopping paradigms using
auditory stop-signals. Two participants that did not fulfill these
criteria were excluded from the sample.We calculated SSRT using
the mean method (Verbruggen and Logan, 2009).
RESULTS
Treatment Phase
Mean GoRT was 467 ms (SEM = 7.5 ms), failed-stop RT
was 393 ms (SEM = 6.3 ms). This difference was significant
[t(64) = 23.7, p = 2.1  10 33, d = 1.35], validating the
independence assumption of the race model. Error (0.2%) and
miss rates (0.6%) were low.Mean p(stop) was 0.52 (SEM= 0.002),
SSD was 279 ms (SEM = 8.5 ms), and SSRT was 188 ms
(SEM= 3.7 ms).
Types of Knowledge
Overall, 22 out of the 65 participants were classified as explicit
learners, i.e., they noted that some of the shapes in the learning
phasewere systematically rewardedwith higher or lower amounts,
and could name the relative value of at least one of the shapes. The
remaining 43 participants showed no verbalizable knowledge of
the regularity [neither unprompted (question 1a) nor prompted
(question 1b)] and were hence classified as implicit learners.
Valuation Phase
Overall, six outliers were removed from the sample (based on
the abovementioned 1.5  IQR criterion for the devaluation
score) before parametric testing, leaving 59 participants in the
analysis. The 2  2  4 ANOVA revealed a significant main
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FIGURE 2 | Bidding data from the valuation phase, split by group.
Depicted are bidding levels from low (1) to high (6), plotted by the actual value
of each shape from the learning phase (L, low; LM, low-medium; HM,
high-medium; H, high). Error bars denote the standard error of the mean
across subjects. (A) Explicit learners; (B) Implicit learners.
effect of VALUE [F(3,171) = 10.23, p < 0.0001, !2p = 0.152],
showing that participants bid significantly higher amounts on
shapes of higher value2. The main effect of STOPPING was also
significant [F(1,57) = 9.74, p = 0.0028, !2p = 0.146], replicating
our previous finding that participants bid significantly less for
shapes that were paired with stopping compared to shapes
that were not. There was no main effect of KNOWLEDGE
[F(1,57) = 1.5, p = 0.23, !2p = 0.026], meaning that participants
did not bid significantly higher or lower overall amounts on
the shapes based on whether they had explicit or implicit
knowledge of the regularity. Crucially, regarding our main
prediction, there was a significant KNOWLEDGE  STOPPING
interaction [F(1,57) = 13.9, p = 0.0004, !2p = 0.196; Figure 2],
indicating that explicit learners showed significantly increased
stopping-induced stimulus devaluation. Furthermore, there was a
significant KNOWLEDGEVALUE interaction [F(3,171)= 4.3,
p = 0.0059, !2p = 0.072], showing that explicit learners bid higher
amounts for shapes with relatively higher value (and vice versa)
compared to implicit learners, reflecting the fact that they had
a better representation of the relative differential values of the
shapes. Finally, there was no significant VALUE  STOPPING
interaction [F(3,171) = 0.95, p = 0.42, !2p = 0.038], and no
significant three-way interaction [F(3,171) = 0.88, p = 0.45
!2p = 0.012].
Within-Subjects Analysis
To investigate whether greater stopping-induced devaluation
in the explicit learner group was indeed due to their explicit
representation of the value of a subset of shapes, we directly
compared the degree of stopping-induced devaluation between
explicitly and implicitly represented shapes in the explicit learner
group. To this end, in each explicit learner, we quantified
stopping-induced stimulus devaluation (in units of percentual
bidding level reduction on shapes that were paired with stopping
relative to shapes that were not paired with stopping) separately
for individual pairs of shapes of identical value. Each pair of
2Individual contrasts revealed the following significant pairings: High> Low
(p < 0.0001), High > Medium Low (p = 0.0007), High > Medium High
(p = 0.0014), Medium High > Low (p = 0.0274), Medium Low > low
(p = 0.0479). The first three contrasts survive Bonferroni correction for
multiple comparisons.
shapes (i.e., the two $0.5 shapes, the two $1 shapes, and so on)
was classified by whether the value of at least one of the two
shapes (the one paired with stopping or the one not paired with
stopping) was explicitly represented, or whether both shapes’
value was implicit (i.e., neither shape was named in the post-
experimental questionnaire as being of relatively high, low, or
medium value). In cases in which more than one pair of shapes
fit either criterion in a given participant, the median of values was
taken. These values were then converted into units of percentual
change between the shape paired with stopping and the shape not
paired with stopping (see above) for each individual participant,
and tested against each other using a paired samples t-test.
Participants in which all four pairs of shapes were classified in
the same condition (viz., at least one shape in each of the four
steps of value had explicitly represented value) were excluded
from this analysis, leaving a final sample of N = 16. This analysis
showed that there was significant stopping-induced devaluation
for pairs of shapes in which the value of at least one of the two
was explicitly represented [t(15) = 2.76, p = 0.015, d = 0.88].
However, in pairs of stimuli in which neither shapes’ value was
explicitly represented, there was no significant stopping-induced
devaluation [t(15) = 1.2, p = 0.25, d = 0.3]. Importantly, the
difference between both conditions was significant, as predicted
by our hypothesis [t(15) = 1.87, p = 0.041, one-sided, d = 0.54;
Figure 3]. Hence, this within-subjects analysis of explicit learners
confirmed the findings from the between group comparison,
underscoring the fact that stopping-induced stimulus devaluation
is indeed increased for explicit value representations.
Control Analyses
Since six outliers were removed from the overall sample before
parametric testing, we repeated our two main analyses of interest
in non-parametric fashion, while including the entire sample of
participants (i.e., including the outliers).
To test the STOPPING effect, we performed aWilcoxon signed-
rank test that compared the average bidding score for the shapes
that were paired with stopping to the average bidding score for the
other shapes. There was a significant effect (z = 2.36, p = 0.018,
r = 0.292), showing again that stopping reduces stimulus value,
and confirming the results from the ANOVA, as well as our prior
studies (Wessel et al., 2014).
To test the KNOWLEDGE  STOPPING interaction, we
computed the mean devaluation score for each participant (i.e.,
the difference between the average bid on the shapes that were
paired with stopping and the average bid on the shapes that were
not), and compared them between groups using aMann-Whitney
U-test. Therewas a significant effect (z= 2.2, p= 0.027, r= 0.273),
showing that explicit learners showed stronger stopping-induced
stimulus devaluation, confirming the results from the ANOVA.
We performed another control analysis to account for the
fact that we changed the experimental parameters after the first
31 participants. To remind the reader, after 31 participants, we
increased the trial numbers for the learning phase (and the
stopping phase) because only five participants showed explicit
knowledge of the differential values of the shapes in the learning
phase. While this change of trial numbers was successful in
increasing the relative proportion of explicit learners, it could
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FIGURE 3 | Devaluation in the explicit learner group, split by type of
knowledge. The bars show stopping-induced devaluation (% reduction of
value on stop-shapes compared to non-stop shapes), separately for pairs of
stimuli of same value in which (a) the value of at least one of the two (stop
shape or no-stop shape) was explicitly represented (orange bar), or (b) the
value of neither shape was explicitly represented (yellow bar).
have potentially influenced the results of our main hypothesis
test (i.e., that explicit learners would show increased stopping-
induced devaluation). Hence, we repeated the 2  2  4 ANOVA
described above, but using only those participants that were
collected after the adjustment of the trial numbers. Despite
the considerably reduced power of this analysis [owing to a
sample size reduction from 59 (22 explicit) to 33 (16 explicit)],
our main results were replicated. The main effect of VALUE
remained significant [F(3,93) = 2.8, p = 0.044, !2p = 0.083], as
did the main effect of STOPPING [F(1,31) = 5.87, p = 0.021,
!2p = 0.159]. The main effect of KNOWLEDGE remained not
significant [F(1,31) = 0.29, p = 0.59, !2p = 0.009]. As for the
interactions, the KNOWLEDGE  VALUE interaction remained
significant [F(3,93) = 3.13, p = 0.0295, !2p = 0.092]. The
KNOWLEDGE  STOPPING interaction remained significant
as a two-sided trend [F(1,31) = 3.38, p = 0.076, !2p = 0.098].
The VALUE  STOPPING interaction [F(3,93) = 0.05, p = 0.99,
!2p = 0.002] and the three-way interaction [F(3,93) = 1.76,
p= 0.16, !2p = 0.054] remained non-significant.
Finally, we repeated the main analysis of the paper while
excluding eight participants that showed explicit knowledge of
the stopping contingency. Just as in our previous report (Wessel
et al., 2014), a small minority of participants developed an explicit
representation of the fact that only some shapes were paired with
stopping (as assessed in our post-experimental questionnaire,
questions 2a and 2b). Since the results in these participants
could potentially be affected by task demand characteristics, we
excluded their data in the previous report, despite the fact that
this exclusion did not affect the results. In the current study, these
participants were not excluded, based on the same finding, i.e.,
based on the fact that their exclusion did not affect the results. The
results of the ANOVA without the eight participants with explicit
knowledge of the stopping contingency (three out of which
were also explicit learners of the learning phase contingency,
while five were not) were as follows: VALUE: F(3,156) = 8.77,
p < 0.0001, !2p = 0.1414; STOPPING: F(1,52) = 9.1, p = 0.004,
!2p = 0.149; KNOWLEDGE: F(1,52) = 1.97, p = 0.167,
!2p= 0.036; KNOWLEDGEVALUE: F(3,156)= 3.72, p= 0.013,
!2p = 0.067; KNOWLEDGE  STOPPING: F(1,52) = 12.1,
p = 0.001, !2p = 0.189; VALUE  STOPPING: F(3,156) = 0.86,
p = 0.46, !2p = 0.016; VALUE  STOPPING  KNOWLEDGE:
F(3,156) = 0.47, p = 0.71, !2p = 0.009. Hence, the main effects
of VALUE and STOPPING, as well as the two-way interactions
of KNOWLEDGE  VALUE and KNOWLEDGE  STOPPING
remained significant, while the main effect of KNOWLEDGE, as
well as the VALUE  STOPPING interaction, and the three-way
interaction remained non-significant. Since three outliers were
removed from this analysis, we again repeated the main tests in
non-parametric fashion, with the outliers remaining in the data.
Again, these analyses confirmed the findings from the parametric
analysis [z = 2.56, p = 0.01, r = 0.34, for the main effect of
STOPPING, and z = 1.86, p = 0.031 (one-sided), r = 0.25, for
the KNOWLEDGE  STOPPING interaction]. Taken together,
these analyses show that excluding the participants with explicit
knowledge of the stopping contingency did not affect our results.
Exploration of Bidding Level Variance
In an auxiliary analysis, we tested whether the variance of the
bidding levels for each shape was decreased in the explicit learner
group compared to the implicit learner group. This would show
that bidding variance is an objective indicator of different levels
of knowledge about the task contingency (i.e., explicit learners
would make more constant bids on the shapes). To test this, we
used the same 2  2  4 ANOVA as for the main analysis (see
Valuation Phase), with the exception that the DV was not the
mean bid for each shape, but the variance of bidding level for each
shape. For the 59 participants that comprised our main analysis,
there was indeed a main effect of KNOWLEDGE on bidding
variance [F(1,57) = 5.39, p = 0.024, !2p = 0.086], showing that
the explicit learners had significantly reduced dispersion in their
bidding behavior, reflective of greater certainty with regards to the
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differential stimulus values. No other main effects or interactions
were significant (all p-values> 0.3).
Additionally, we compared bidding variances within subjects
in the explicit learner group. We averaged the bidding variances
for the shapes that these participants explicitly named as being of
specific value, and compared it to the bidding variances on the
implicit shapes (i.e., those that were not explicitly associated with
value). In line with the above results, this analysis showed that
bidding variance was significantly reduced in shapes that were
explicitly named to be of specific value, which was a significant
two-sided trend [t(18) = 1.877, p = 0.077, d = 0.37]. These
results further hint at bidding variance as a suitable indicator of
explicit knowledge, at least in the context of value assayed in an
auction such as the one in our current paradigm. It is furthermore
possible (or even likely) that these trials account for the finding
presented in the previous paragraph, i.e., that bidding variance
differs between explicit and implicit learners only because of the
shapes whose values were explicitly represented. However, it is
hard to explicitly test this hypothesis in the current framework, as
explicit learners differed with respect to the numbers and specific
subsets of shapes whose values were explicitly represented. Hence,
it is not possible to exclude the explicitly named shapes from
the analysis for each explicit learner while still maintaining a
factorial design with a valid between-subjects factor. Still, this
analysis shows that bidding variance appears to be an indicator
of bidding confidence, and directly related to the amount of
explicit knowledge about stimulus value. However, since this was
an exploratory analysis, these results have to be interpreted with
caution, and further research is needed to explicitly elucidate the
relationship between bidding variance and explicit knowledge of
stimulus value.
Analysis of Implicit Learners
In another exploratory data analysis, we investigated whether
there was significant stopping-induced stimulus devaluation in
our sample of implicit learners alone. We computed a 2  3
ANOVA that included only the factors VALUE and STOPPING
(this is the same ANOVA that was done in Wessel et al., 2014).
Just like the overall sample, the implicit learner group had a
significant main effect of VALUE [F(3,126) = 3.31, p = 0.022,
!2p = 0.073]. However, there was no significant main effect of
STOPPING [F(1,42) = 1.52, p = 0.22, !2p = 0.035], despite a
numerical reduction in bids for the shapes that were paired with
stopping compared with shapes that were not, which was present
in all four value conditions (Figure 2B). As in the overall sample,
there was no STOPPING VALUE interaction [F(3,126)= 0.48,
p= 0.7, !2p = 0.01].
In a second exploratory analysis of the implicit learner
group, we tested whether different degrees of acquired implicit
knowledge were associated with different degrees of stopping-
induced devaluation. To this end, we quantified the bidding
variance for each participant in the implicit learner group,
specifically for the shapes of highest ($4) and lowest ($0.5) value,
to derive one compound measure of bidding variance that would
best reflect the degree of acquired implicit knowledge about the
differential values of the shapes. We selected the highest and
lowest shapes because those were the stimuli whose differential
FIGURE 4 | Correlation between implicit learners’ bidding variance on
the most and least valuable shapes and stopping-induced
devaluation. Since lower bid variance is a proxy of the degree of acquired
task knowledge (see comparison of explicit vs. implicit learners in Section
“Exploration of Bidding Level Variance”), this individual differences analysis
suggests that implicit learners with higher degrees of acquired knowledge had
a greater devaluation effect.
values were the most obvious (this was reflected in the fact that
any explicit knowledge about differential values in the explicit
learner group always included the value of either the highest
or lowest value stimuli). We then correlated this measurement
with the participant’s devaluation scores (i.e., the difference in
bidding level between the stopping and non-stopping shapes; see
above). This analysis revealed a significant negative correlation
across subjects (Pearson’s r =  0.36, p = 0.027; 5 out of 43
participants were removed from this analysis based on an outlier
diagnostic based on a criterion of Cook’s distance > 4N ). This
correlation shows that implicit learners with less variance in
their bids (i.e., who had greater amounts of acquired implicit
knowledge) had a greater degree of stopping-induced stimulus
devaluation (Figure 4).
DISCUSSION
We replicated Experiments 1 and 2 of Wessel et al. (2014) by
showing again that action stopping reduces stimulus value. We
also went further by showing that stopping-induced stimulus
devaluation is increased in participants that have explicit
knowledge about the relative values of rewarding stimuli,
compared to participants whose stimulus-reward associations are
fully implicit.
Our demonstration that stopping-induced devaluation is
greater for explicit value representations could have strong
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practical importance. Most reward-related stimuli in realistic
contexts are associated with explicit valuation; i.e., people are
generally aware of their associated incentive value. The stimulus
material in the current study closely mimics the nature of these
real-life valuations. For example, most rewarding stimuli in real-
life (e.g., a piece of cake or a cigarette) initially have very little
associated reward value per se—similar to the shapes in our
study. Over the lifespan, however, these stimuli become paired
with rewarding outcomes, and hence, accumulate more and more
explicit reward value, very similar to the shapes in our study. Our
current findings imply that behavioral therapies using stopping
could be successful in realistic contexts in which explicit reward
associations have to be targeted for devaluation. They also suggest
that reduced consumption of primary reinforcers after stopping or
withholding a response to reinforcer-related stimuli could indeed
be due to a reduction of value of these reinforcers, as previously
speculated (Kiss et al., 2008;Veling et al., 2008, 2013;Houben et al.,
2012a).
It is of note that while the group of participants with
fully implicit value representations had a significantly reduced
stopping-induced devaluation effect compared to the explicit
group (in fact, stopping-induced devaluation in the implicit group
was non-significant), there was still a significant main effect of
value in the implicit group. Hence, these participants bid more for
shapes that were worth more, despite not being able to verbalize
any systematic value differences between shapes. This suggests
that, even without an explicit value representation, they were not
bidding randomly; and that the auction method was effective in
capturing implicit value representations (see also Persaud et al.,
2007). Furthermore, our exploratory data analyses indicated that
even within this implicit learner group, the degree of acquired
knowledge of the differential values was directly related to the
degree of stopping-induced devaluation: participants with less
variance in their bids (putatively reflecting a greater degree of
acquired implicit knowledge) showed stronger stopping-induced
stimulus devaluation. This is in line with the implicit learning
literature, which shows that the emergence of explicit knowledge
is a direct consequence of progressively increasing amounts of
implicit knowledge (Seger, 1994; Frensch et al., 2003; Rose et al.,
2010; Wessel et al., 2012). In our case, this would predict that
the more knowledge implicit learners have acquired, the more
similar their behavior (in this case, stopping-induced stimulus
devaluation) should become to explicit learners, whichwas indeed
the case. Taken together, these results further strengthen our
initial assertion that more stable value representations are more
susceptible to stopping-induced stimulus devaluation.
The question of why explicit value representations are
more affected by stopping-induced devaluation comes down
to the mechanism by which the action stopping procedure
induces stimulus devaluation. Control experiments in our initial
study (Wessel et al., 2014) argued against several possible
explanations including infrequent signal detection, stimulus
frequency, response-conflict, effort, or error processing, leaving
the likely possibility that it was specifically a putatively broad
suppressive process on stop trials that induced the value
reduction. However, validating this theory requires assaying value
representations trial-by-trial, and probably separating successful
and failed stop trials; something that appears difficult with
behavioral methods alone, and which awaits investigation with
a technique such as fMRI. Future studies could also examine
how long the stopping-induced devaluation lasts, and whether it
generalizes to stimuli in a wider category.
In conclusion, while questions remain about the neural and
psychological mechanisms by which stopping reduces stimulus
value, whether it owes to successful or failed stop trials, and
whether it is long-lasting and generalizes to other stimuli, the
core effect is replicable. Moreover, we here show that it is
particularly strong in those participants who have explicit value
representations. This helps constrain the sorts of real world
scenarios in which stopping-induced devaluation is likely to be
effective. A natural next step would be to use an analogous
procedure to test whether stimulus-devaluation can be achieved
with stimuli that represent realistic rewards, such as cigarettes or
cake. To facilitate such future investigations, we have provided
documented code for running this experimental framework along
with this paper.
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